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Barbara B. Uzelac ("Barbara") petitions the Court for rehearing. Barbara will
show that the Court's decision violates the law of case doctrine, misstates the record,
misstates the standard of review, and misapplies Utah law to the undisputed facts before
the Court. Barbara attaches a copy of the Court's opinion as Exhibit A ("Uzelac II") and
a copy of the first appellate decision as Exhibit B ("Uzelac I").
1.

The Court's Decision Violates the Law of the Case Doctrine.
a.

The Court Denied the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead on the Basis
of an Argument that Was Required to be Raised in Uzelac I but Was
Not Raised There.

Barbara appealed the trial court's September 27, 2003 Minute Entry in Uzelac I.
Notice of Appeal, R. 1366-67. After stating that "Barbara is a Both a Beneficiary and A
Claimant Against the Estate," she asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the Minute Entry.
Appellant's Brief at 13,20-21. She specifically noted that a reversal of the trial court's
interpretation of the Antenuptial Agreement without a reversal of the Minute Entry would
leave her without a remedy because any new motion to recover the Homestead would be
untimely. Appellant's Reply Brief at 15. The personal representative could have argued
that reversal of the Minute Entry would be inappropriate if the Court found Barbara was
only a devisee. He could have argued that Barbara's Motion was brought against the
estate and not against the Children. He could have raised other arguments. But he did
not do so. Appellee's Brief in Uzelac I at 24-26. Uzelac I reversed the Minute Entry
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even though it expressly held that Barbara could not proceed as a creditor. Uzelac I at

imi4,2i.
As discussed in greater detail below, on remand, the trial court held Barbara's
Motion to Recover the Homestead was procedurally defective as being "against the
estate" and not against the Children. R. 1755. This Court denied Barbara's motion
because she identified herself as a creditor in her motion. Uzelac II at ^[15-17. Either
argument was required to be raised in the first appeal. See DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises,
935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1997) ("Those issues were ripe for appeal at that time, and the
Debrys' failure to raise them [in their first] appeal resulted in a waiver of their right to
raise them at a later time.")1 In fact, any argument that should have been raised in the
first appeal in favor of affirming the Minute Entry has been waived.
b.

The Court Used the "Marital Estate Analogue" that was Expressly
Rejected by the Majority in Uzelac I.

In paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8,15, and 18, the Court analyzed the case on the basis of a
"marital estate analogue" that it inaccurately stated Uzelac I had adopted in paragraphs
20-21. Uzelac II, ^[7. Paragraphs 19-20 of Uzelac I used two divorce court decisions
interpreting the term "acquired by the parties" to interpret that same term in the
Antenuptial Agreement. On the other hand, Judge Orme developed the "marital estate

1

As intervenors, the Children are bound by the procedural and substantive history
of the case as it existed at the time of intervention. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 285
(Utah 1982). Thus, any claim that was or could have been resolved in the first appeal
may not be raised by the Children now.
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analogue" in his concurring opinion. Uzelac I at ffi[27-30. After Barbara petitioned for
rehearing, the majority rejected Judge Orme's marital estate analysis.
We do not concur in Judge Ormefs concurring opinion. The issue discussed
therein was not before the court, we did not address it, and it should not be
considered the law of the case.
Uzelac 1,1J21, fn.2. See also ^8, footnote 1 (where the Court wonders why neither party
used the "marital estate analogue" and states it will not do so). Using an analysis
disavoved by the majority in Uzelac I violates the law of the case doctrine. Thurston v.
Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Utah 1995).2
Relying on its "marital estate analogue," the Court adds the word "marital" to the
Antenuptial Agreement. Uzelac I rejected the trial court's addition of the word "together"
after "property acquired by the parties" on the basis that the court could not add words to
the agreement. Uzelac 1,1Hfl6 and 19. Now Uzelac II adds the word "marital" before
"property acquired by the parties." See \ 1, \2, f7, ^[8 fn.l, f 18, \\9. This violates Utah
law and the law of the case doctrine. Uzelac I,ffi[16and 19.
Furthermore, by using the "marital estate analogue," the Court adopted the precise
argument, rejected in Uzelac I, made by the personal representative in support of
affirming the Minute Entry. The personal representative argued:
Barbara's assertion that reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the Ante
Nuptial Agreement would mandate a reversal of the Minute Order

2

The Court could conduct the analysis required by Thurston v. Box Elder County
to determine if its prior decision should be reversed. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037-39.
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approving the Deed overreaches. Even if Barbara were to prevail on her
interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, this would
entitle her to receive only property acquired during the marriage. Property
owned by Lou prior to the marriage such as the real property conveyed via
the Deed would still pass to his daughters under both Barbara's and the
Personal Representative's interpretations of the paragraph 1 of the Ante
Nuptial Agreement.
Appellee's Brief at 26, fn. 3 (emphasis in original); compare Uzelac II ^[18.
Violating the law of the case doctrine has led the Court to misapprehend the status
of the Homestead. The estate held the Homestead from Louis' death (November 6, 1999)
until the deed of distribution was executed on May 19, 2003. As expressly agreed by
Louis and Barbara in paragraph 1 of the Antenuptial Agreement, the Homestead became
part of "Louis' estate." There was a third parcel of "premarital" Homestead property that
was sold and used to pay estate expenses. R.1580, fn. 1. Because of the specific devise
of the life estate to Barbara, the remainder interest was available to pay any general
devise. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(1); Restatement (Third) of Property; Wills and Other
Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification Of Devises (1999). The Court expressly held
Barbara's $230,660.90 devise was a general devise and the Children also took as general
devisees. f21. The Court's holding that the estate had no right to the Homestead is
legally and factually inaccurate. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-101 (estate devolves subject to
administration); Uzelac II at f 18. Finally, the Court is not adjudicating marital property
rights. It is interpreting a 1976 contract. "All property, whether real, personal or mixed
acquired by the parties" would include acquisitions during the marriage of non-marital
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property (e.g. inheritances or earnings on marital property) as defined in post 1990
divorce cases.
c.

The Court Improperly Treated the Vacated September 27, 2003
Minute Entry as an Existing and Controlling Order.

Uzelac I expressly vacated the September 27, 2003. Uzelac I ^[21. Upon remand
the trial court was required to accept that ruling, and on appeal, this Court was required to
accept that ruling, subject only to the Thurston v. Box Elder County analysis. Thurston,
892 P.2d at 1037-39. While the trial court could (and did) enter a new order denying the
Motion to Reconvey the Homestead, it could not resurrect the Minute Entry.
Although the Minute Entry had been vacated, the Court in paragraphs 6, 16, and 17
treats the Minute Entry as a valid and existing order. ^[6 (discussing legal reasoning of
Minute Entry), \\6 (Barbara filed her second notice of appeal 3 years after vacated
Minute Entry); \\1 (holding that the vacated Minute Entry was a final appealable order
under Harward v. Voorhees, 366 P.2d 977 (Utah 1961)). Doing so violated the law of the
case doctrine.
2.

Uzelac II Misstates the Record.
a.

Barbara Did Not File her Motion to Reconvey the Homestead "Against
the Estate."

In concurring in the trial court's holding that Barbara "clearly" did not file a
proceeding against the Children to recover the Homestead, the Court analyzed an issue
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not addressed by the trial court: whether Barbara had properly presented her claim
against the estate. Uzelac II, ^fl5. The September 27, 2003 Minute Entry stated:
As an initial matter, issues pertaining to an interpretation of the Ante
Nuptial Agreement and to Uzelac's "damages theory" are the proper subject
of the October 7, 2003, trial or have been previously addressed in the
Court's Order on the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. That said, the
sole issue currently before this Court is whether a basis exists for the Court
to order decedent's daughters to return the distributed property.
R. 1080-81. Contrary to its August 10, 2006 ruling, R. 1755, the trial court's Minute
Entry recognized that Barbara's motion was filed against the daughters. It further
recognized that Barbara's pending creditor's claim was not ripe for adjudication. The
trial court did not hold Barbara's pending creditor's claim barred by the affirmative
defense of limitations until the trial held on October 7, 2003. R.1340-48.
In its August 10, 2006 ruling, the trial court did not base its decision on Barbara's
identification of herself as a creditor.
5.
The daughters were granted the right to intervene on November 17,
2005, in order to respond to the claim for recovery made by Mrs. Uzelac,
which claim had been made against the Estate.
6.
It is clear that no proceedings against either of the distributees of the
real property requested by to be recovered has been instituted. The claim of
Mrs. Uzelac that her claim as a creditor of the Estate was sufficient to put
the daughters on notice is not well taken. The statute is clear that the action
must be against the distributees, not the Estate.
R. 1755. Thus, the trial court ruled that Barbara's Motion to Reconvey the Homestead
was against the estate, because the Children did not intervene until November 2005. As
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such, putting the Children "on notice" was not "well taken" because the trial court viewed
the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead as one against the Estate, not the Children.
Because the trial court's August 2006 decision was based on its erroneous belief
that a proceeding against the Children could not be undertaken unless they were made
party defendants or had formally intervened, Barbara's briefing established that under the
probate code, interested persons initiate proceedings for relief authorized in the probate
code, including relief under Sections 75-3-909 and 75-3-1004, by filing a written pleading
seeking relief and mailing a copy of the pleading to other "interested persons."
Appellant's Brief at 13-17. Barbara's Motion to Reconvey the Homestead was filed "in"
the estate case, but it was a proceeding "against" the Children.
Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter and may
petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court's
jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those described in this chapter.
The court may hear and determine formal proceedings involving
administration and distribution of decedents1 estates after notice to
interested persons in conformity with Section 75-1-401. Persons notified are
bound though less than all interested persons may have been given notice.
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-105. Thus, Barbara refuted the trial court's reasoning.
b.

The Court of Appeals' Analysis Is Inequitable and Violates the Law of
the Case.

As shown, the Court misconstrued the trial court's ruling. The Court substituted
its own analysis holding that Barbara's identification of herself as a creditor prevented her
motion from being granted on remand. While Barbara identified herself as a creditor, and
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not a devisee, it is inequitable to deny her motion on that ground. Both the personal
representative and the Children filed memoranda in opposition to Barbara's motion.
R.942-958 (personal representative's); R.959-967 (Children). Neither raised this defense.
Given Utah's misnomer cases (excusing the failure to identify correctly a party to a case)
and given the fact that the trial court and this Court sit as courts of equity, the Court
should excuse Barbara's failure to wear her "devisee" hat in filing her motion. Wilcox v.
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah 1996); Hughes v. Cafferty, ^24, 89 P.3d
148, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2004 UT 22 (Utah 2004); Utah Code Ann. §75-1-302(2).
However, as noted above, to the extent Barbara's failure is fatal, that claim may not be
raised on this second appeal. DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah
1997). Having not raised it on the first appeal, the personal representative waived it.
Comparing the trial court's Minute Entry with its August 10, 2006 Ruling shows it
is contradicting itself. Compare R. 1079-80 with R. 1750-56. The Children opposed the
Motion on the merits. R.959-967. Although opposing the motion, the personal
representative expressly acknowledged in his response that Barbara "[was] a beneficiary
under Lou!s will." R.942-948; see R.943 (acknowledgment). With regard to Barbara's
motion and the personal representative's response, the Court stated in paragraph 17:
"Merely mailing the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead to the PR without explaining
that the motion was intended to constitute a proceeding against the Children, we
explained, 'does not begin to satisfy the requirements of notice pleading.'" The language
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quoted from Uzelac I had nothing to do with the Motion to Reconvey. In any event, Utah
law does not require Barbara to tell the personal representative something that the
personal representative could learn by reading the motion and its prayer for relief. His
memorandum in opposition shows he understood the purpose of the Motion. R.942-58.
The law of the case is designed to prevent precisely what is happening to Barbara.
Kurt Vonnegut might enjoy the "catch 22" in which Barbara finds herself, but Barbara
finds it incredibly unjust. The Court's decision in Uzelac II not only requires Barbara to
defeat the trial court's contradictory legal conclusion (R.1755), but she must also defend
her hard earned victory in Uzelac I as well. This Court should not be party to this
injustice.
c.

The September 27,2003 Minute Entry.

After selectively describing the trial court's reasoning in its Minute Entry in
paragraph 6, the Court states in paragraph 7 that Uzelac I affirmed the trial court. It then
inaccurately states that Uzelac I used the "marital estate analogue" in vacating the Minute
Entry. As noted above, Uzelac I expressly rejected Judge Orme's marital estate analysis.
Contrary to the Court's statement, Uzelac I vacated the trial court's Minute Entry and all
other orders "based on its erroneous interpretation of the [Antenuptial] Agreement" alone.
Uzelac I,1f2l.
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3.

Barbara, as a General Devisee, is Entitled to Payment of her Devise from the
General Assets of the Estate.
In paragraph 20, the Court holds that Barbara must be a pecuniary devisee in order

to recover the distributed homestead. That is inaccurate. "A general devise is a
testamentary disposition, usually of a specified amount of money or quantity of property,
that is payable from the general assets of the estate'' Restatement (Third) of Property;
Wills and Other Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification Of Devises (1999) (emphasis
added). As a general devisee, Barbara has a claim upon all of the assets of the estate that
are not otherwise specifically devised. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d). The remainder
interest in the Homestead is one of those assets. Her devise abates pro rata with other
general devisees, such as the Children. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d) (text following
(d)).
4.

Barbara is a General Pecuniary Devisee.
a.

The Court Misstated the Standard of Review.

In paragraph 11, the Court held the classification of a devise is a mixed question of
law and fact, requiring some deference to be given to the trial court's decision. However,
when the facts are undisputed and based on documentary evidence, the proper standard of
review is correction of error. Matter of Estate ofErickson, 806 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Utah
1991).
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b.

Barbara Has Established She is a Pecuniary Devisee.

In paragraph 20, the Court appears to view a general devise and a pecuniary devise
as mutually exclusive. However, "[a] species of a general devise is a devise of a specified
amount of money." Restatement (Third) of Prop.; Wills and Other Donative Transfers,
§5.1 Classification of Devises, cmt. c (1999). The Court states that Barbara's entitlement
to a dollar amount of judgment "alone" does not make the devise a pecuniary devise, but
the Court never states what is missing in this case that would make the devise a pecuniary
one, Without that analysis, the Court has not resolved the issue.
Barbara's devise is a devise charged to specific property. f21. The specific
property, being unavailable, she is a general devisee. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d)
(text following (d)). To determine the amount of the devise, the trial court calculated the
amount due Barbara under the Antenuptial Agreement, incorporated in the will, exactly
like it would in any type of formula calculation. Restatement (Third) of Prop.; Wills and
Other Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification of Devises, cmt. c (1999).
Had the specific property been in the estate, Barbara would have been entitled to
that property as a specific devisee. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d) (text following (d)).
As such, Barbara would have received all of the earnings and accretions on that property
from Louis' date of death. Utah Code Ann. §22-3-201(1). Where the property is not
available and the general devise is calculated as a specific dollar amount, it is only logical
that it bear interest in partial compensation for the earnings that otherwise would have
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accrued to Barbara had the property been available. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-904. Thus,
the calculation of a dollar amount does not stand "alone." The calculated devise replaces
a devise where Barbara would have received all of the earnings from Louis' date of death.
5.

The Court Made Other Errors.
a.

Barbara Is Not Required to Abandon her Life Estate.

Footnote 2, paragraph 15, states in dicta that if the Homestead were reconveyed,
Barbara would lose her life estate interest. That is incorrect. The Children would
reconvey the remainder interest. Barbara does not have to give up her interest for the
estate to sell the remainder interest in the Homestead. As a practical matter, Barbara
believes it will enhance the value for all parties to sell both the life interest and the
remainder interest. Regardless, Barbara is not required to give away her life interest with
the sale of the remainder interest. In essence, the Court is chiding Barbara for wanting to
receive the greatest benefit possible from her husband's estate. One would think the court
would have some sympathy for an 81 year old widow of over 8 years who was entitled to
$230,660.90 and is receiving nothing.
b.

Section 75-3-412 Only Applies to Formal Testamentary Orders. In

dicta in paragraph 16, the Court states that Section 75-3-412 applies to Barbara's Motion
to Reconvey the Homestead. That section states it only applies to "a formal testacy order
under this part." Part 4 is titled "Formal Testacy and Appointment Proceedings." Section
75-3-401 states that a "formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a
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decedent left a valid will." Louis' will was admitted to probate without objection on
December 7, 1999. R. 13-14. The Court's comment that Barbara's logic leads to the
conclusion that the Minute Entry was a formal testacy order has no basis in fact, law, or
logic. The onlyfinaltestacy order in this case was entered on December 7, 1999 and
became final on January 6, 2000. R. 13-14.
Even assuming the Court's September 27, 2003 Minute Entry continued to be a
valid and binding order after Uzelac I, Section 75-3-412 and 75-3-414 would never apply
to that Minute Entry. Barbara's Motion to Reconvey did not seek a "formal testacy
order." Rather, Section 75-1-308 governed the original appeal of the Minute Entry.
Pursuant to that procedure, Uzelac I vacated the Minute Entry Order.
The Court's misapplication of probate law will have pernicious consequences for
future probate litigants. Since the Court of Appeals has now defined a motion to recover
distributed property authorized under Sections 75-3-909, 75-3-1004, and 75-3-1006 as a
"formal testacy order," litigants must appeal every order as a potential "formal testacy
order" notwithstanding the language in Sections 75-3-401 and -412 to the contrary.
Barbara asks the Court to delete this inaccurate statement of Utah law from its opinion.
Conclusion
If the Court grants this petition for rehearing, this is the practical effect of that
ruling:
a.
Barbara's devise would be calculated with interest under Section 753-904.
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b.
The Children would be required to return the remainder interest in the
Homestead.
c.
The personal representative would sell that interest to raise money to pay
Barbara's pecuniary devise.
d.

Barbara could choose to sell her life estate or not as she deemed advisable.

e.
Because both the devise to the Children and the devise to Barbara are
general devises, each would abate pro-rata in order to pay the devises to the
Children and the devise to Barbara.
f.

Upon completion of these tasks, the estate would be closed.

Barbara submits this would be the correct result, and one that is far more reasonable and
just than results from the Court's opinion.
If the Court denies Barbara's motion for rehearing, she will be left to ponder why
the panel in Uzelac I did not affirm the Minute Entry as requested by the personal
representative. Had it done so, at least Barbara would have avoided three more years of
effort and expense to obtain a worthless $230,660.90 devise.
CERTIFICATION
Charles M. Bennett certifies that this Petition has been filed in good faith and not
for delay.
Dated this Aj[ day of February, 2008.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

.harlesM^B€hnett
Attorneys for Barbara B. Uzelac
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EXHIBIT A
UZELAC II
In the Matter of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac
2008 UT App 33

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

In the matter of the Estate of
Louis J. Uzelac.

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20060858-CA

Barbara B. Uzelac,
Plaintiff, Appellant and
Cross-appellee,

F I L E D
( J a n u a r y 3 1 , 2008)
2008 UT App 33

v.
Joseph Uzelac Jr., as
representative of the Estate,
Defendant
Susan Brooke Mageras and
Allyson D. Uzelac,
Intervenors, Appellees,
and Cross-appellants.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 993901690
The Honorable L.A. Dever
Attorneys:

Charles M. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and
Cross-appellee
Margaret H. Olson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees and
Cross-appellants

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh.
DAVIS, Judge:
ll
Appellant Barbara B. Uzelac (Wife) argues that the trial
court, on remand from our prior review, see Uzelac v. Uzelac (In
re Estate of Uzelac) (Uzelac I), 2005 UT App 234, K 25, 114 P.3d
1164, erred in denying her motion to compel the return of Louis
Uzelac's (Husband) premarital property (the Homestead) to his
estate. Wife argues that the Homestead must be sold in order to
pay for the $230,660.90 judgment in her favor assessed against

the estate. Intervenors Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D.
Uzelac (the Children) cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court
erred by including Husband's payable on death (POD) accounts in
the judgment calculations. We disagree with both parties and
affirm.

BACKGROUND
12
Prior to Husband and Wife's marriage, they executed an Ante
Nuptial Agreement (the Agreement). See id. 1 2. The Agreement
provided that "all of the real, personal or mixed property owned
by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and
separate property of him or her or their respective estates."
Under the Agreement, all marital property would "go to the
survivor" if one spouse should predecease the other. The
Agreement also provided Wife with "the right to reside in [the
Homestead] for her lifetime, or such shorter time as she may
elect."
%3
Husband later prepared a will (the Will), dividing his
estate as follows: "(1) all debts, expenses, and administration
expenses are to be paid; (2) Husband's two daughters are to
receive equal shares of Husband's property; (3) Wife is to
receive property per the terms of the Agreement; and
(4) Husband's two granddaughters are to receive $5000.00 each."
Id. H 3. Specifically, the Will stated, "I give, devise and
bequeath . . . to my children . . . all of my property, real
mixed or personal, share and share alike . . . .
[and t]o
[W]ife . . . , she is to receive per the terms of [the
Agreement] . . . ."
1|4
Upon his death on November 6, 1999, "Husband had three [POD]
accounts totaling $189,049.15 with his two daughters as
beneficiaries, and one POD account totaling $12,790.00 with Wife
as beneficiary." Id. ^ 5. Additionally, at his death Husband's
non-POD accounts held funds totaling $75,876.85, and he had
stocks worth $36,950.91. See id.
i[5
The Personal Representative (the PR) distributed the estate
as follows: Wife received a POD account "in [her] name," a life
estate in the Homestead, and $4,858.83 from the couple's joint
accounts, in addition to the $15,000.00 that was deposited in a
joint account post-mortem. See id. *h 6. The Children received
all other property, including the Homestead subject to Wife's
life estate. See id. On July 28, 2003, Wife filed a Motion for
an Order Directing Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the
Estate, or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution,
(Motion to Reconvey the Homestead), arguing that the distribution
violated the Agreement, which was incorporated by reference into
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the Will, and that as a creditor, her claims must be paid before
those of the Children.
%6
The trial court found "no basis for [Wife]'s request,"
denying the motion on two grounds. First, to claim creditor
status, Wife was required to file a "written demand" with the PR
within "two years of the death of [Husband]," Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-6-107 (1993), which the trial court found that she had
failed to do. As we explained in Uzelac I, "[m]erely providing
the PR with a copy of the Agreement, which all parties have
always agreed is binding, without explaining how the Agreement
had been breached or the amount [Wife] was claiming as a creditor
under the Agreement, does not begin to satisfy the requirements
of notice pleading." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, 1 14, 114 P.3d
1164. Second, Wife's argument that the PR breached his duty to
administer in accordance with the rights of the claimants failed
because the PR had given Wife a life estate in the Homestead, as
required by the Agreement, while giving the Children the
remaining rights to the Homestead as provided for in the Will.
f7
In Uzelac I we affirmed the trial court, rejecting Wife's
claim brought as a creditor because such a claim against the
estate was time-barred under Utah Code section 75-3-803 due to
insufficient notice pleading. See id. ^[ 11-14. However, using
the analogue of a marital estate from our divorce jurisprudence,
we vacated the trial court's rulings and remanded, instructing
the trial court to determine the amount owed to Wife as
beneficiary per the Agreement. See id. ^|f 20-21. We also
ordered the trial court to "determin[e] . . . what property of
Husband's is available to satisfy her claim." Id. % 21.
%8
On remand, the parties stipulated that "the only property
acquired by [Husband] that is subject to [Wife's] claim is the
cash (including stocks) on hand at his death." The parties also
stipulated that there was $277,716.00 in cash on deposit1 and
nine stocks Husband held at his death. The court assessed the
value of those stocks that had been acquired after marriage at
Notwithstanding our marital estate analogue in Uzelac v.
Uzelac (In re Estate of Uzelac) (Uzelac I ) , 2005 UT App 234, 114
P.3d 1164, neither party addresses the source of these funds
(i.e. pre-marital or post-marital) in the trial court or on
appeal. Thus, we do not address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (declining to address certain claims
because of "our general rule that 'issues not raised at trial
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal'" (quoting State v.
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994))); State v. Jennings, 875
P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider
issues not argued in the appellant's brief).
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$27,747.33, resulting in a subtotal of $305,463.33. The trial
court then deducted $74,802.43 from this sum for a gift from
Husband to Wife, a POD account in Wife's name at the time of the
marriage (minus an insurance claim), and an account in Husband's
name. Thus, the trial court found that there was $230,660.90 in
"after acquired property" and concluded that Wife was entitled to
that amount. However, the trial court further concluded that
Wife as barred from recovering the $23 0,66 0.90 by Utah Code
section 75-3-1006 because Wife did not commence a proceeding
against the Children within the time specified by the statute of
limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 (1992).
1)9
The trial court also determined, citing the Restatement of
Property, see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers § 5.1 cmt. c (1999), that the Children were
general devisees due to the "all of my property" language in the
Will, and not residuary devisees. The trial court further noted
that the Will "does not have a residuary clause."
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1|l0 Wife contends that the court improperly denied her Motion to
Reconvey the Homestead, arguing that this motion amounted to a
proceeding against the Children. Whether the trial court erred
in interpreting Utah statutes to deny a motion is a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness. See In re VKS, 2003 UT
App 13, 1 7, 63 P.3d 1284.
fll Wife argues next that her 2003 Motion to Reconvey the
Homestead should have been granted because the Children were
residual devisees and she is a general pecuniary devisee. If the
trial court had agreed with Wife that the Children are residuary
devisees and that she is a general pecuniary devisee, Wife's
$230,660.90 claim against the estate must be satisfied before the
estate can satisfy the Children's claims under the Will. See
generally Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers § 5.1 (1999). Given the financial situation, this
would mean the Children would have to reconvey the Homestead to
the estate. The categorization of devisees is a mixed question
of fact and law; we accord some deference to the trial court.
See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1 57, 82 P.3d 1076;
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994) .
fl2 The Children cross-appeal and argue that the trial court
improperly included POD accounts in determining "the amount owed
to Wife as a beneficiary under the Will as per the Agreement,"
Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, H 21, 114 P.3d 1164. We review a
trial court's interpretation of our unambiguous order for
correctness. See Bettincrer v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1990). "However, if the trial court determines the
language of an order is ambiguous and finds facts based upon
extrinsic evidence, our review of those findings is limited to
determining whether they are clearly erroneous." Southwick v.
Leone (In re Estate of Leone), 860 P.2d 973, 975 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (citing Bettinger, 793 P.2d at 392).
ANALYSIS
I. The Homestead
1(13 Wife argues that she did initiate a proceeding against the
Children and thereby is not time-barred from recovering against
the estate via a reconveyance and sale of the Homestead. She
cites Utah Code section 75-3-105(1), which states that " [p]ersons
interested in decedents' estates may . . . petition the court for
orders in formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction,
including, but not limited to those described in this chapter."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1993). Specifically, Wife argues
that the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead, which was filed
against the estate (and served on the Children and the PR), was
not subject to section 75-3-803's time bar because it served as
notice under section 75-1-401, a pleading under section 75-3105(1), and a proceeding under section 75-3-106 against the
Children. We disagree.
1[l4 The Utah Probate Code defines a "formal proceeding" as a
"proceeding [] conducted before a judge with notice to interested
persons." Id. § 75-1-201(18) (Supp. 2007). "Each proceeding
before the court or registrar is independent of any other
proceeding involving the same estate," id. § 75-3-106 (1) (a)
(1993), even though " [p]etitions for formal orders of the court
may combine various requests for relief in a single proceeding,"
id. § 75-3-106 (1) (b) .
1l5 The trial court ruled that "the action must be against [the
Children], not the [e]state," that "[i]t is clear that no
proceedings against either of the distributees of the real
property requested by [Wife] to be recovered has been
instituted," and that the Wife's argument that "her claim as a
creditor of the estate was sufficient to put [the Children] on
notice is not well taken." In order for the Children to be
placed on sufficient notice, "the written statement of claim must
at least describe 'the general nature of the obligation,* as
measured by the 'notice pleading standard' under rule eight of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234,
f 13 (quoting Ouinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
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1989)). Therefore, we agree with the trial court that no
proceeding was brought against the Children.2
fl6 Even if the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead were a
proceeding under the Utah Probate Code, a formal testacy order
resulting from a proceeding is generally final "as to all persons
with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that
the court considered," subject to appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3412(1) (1993). The denial of the Motion to Reconvey the
Homestead on September 29, 2003, if we followed Wife's logic,
would be deemed a formal testacy order. Because final orders by
a court probating a will are subject to the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, see id. § 75-1-308, Wife had thirty days to
appeal the denial of her motion. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Yet
Wife filed her notice of appeal on September 19, 2006, nearly
three years after the denial.
%11 Wife argues that her claim remains timely due to our remand
in Uzelac I, which she contends vacated the initial determination
that Wife's claim was time-barred. However, the 2003 motion was
premised on Wife's status as creditor, and we previously held
that "even assuming that Wife would otherwise qualify as a
creditor, her claim is barred by the one-year limitation in
section 75-3-803." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, f 14, 114 P.3d
1164. Merely mailing the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead to the
PR without explaining that the motion was intended to constitute
a proceeding against the Children, we explained, "does not begin
to satisfy the requirements of notice pleading." Id. Moreover,
"[t]he fact that the court retained jurisdiction . . . to
adjudicate further matters did not leave open for reconsideration
the question as to" whether the Homestead should be sold to
satisfy Wife's claims. Havward v. Voorhees (In re Estate of
Voorhees), 366 P.2d 977, 980 (Utah 1961). "There was nothing
further to be decided on that particular issue . . . .
That
being so, the decree entered thereon was final and therefore
appealable. Since [Wife] took no appeal within the time allowed
by law, that decree is conclusive." Id. (footnote omitted).

2

We note that if the property were reconveyed and sold at
Wife's behest, her life estate in the Homestead would have no
value because she loses her possessory interest in the Homestead
the moment she moves out for a sale. Cf. Jeffs v. Stubbsf 970
P.2d 1234, 1242 n.6 (Utah 1998) ("Because the . . .
claimants . . . could occupy the land for their lives, so long as
they did not sell, mortgage, or abandon the property, the
claimants' interest is actually a life estate subject to a
condition subsequent.").
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1fl8 Furthermore, even if we were to hold that Wife's motion was
a proceeding and was timely, the estate would have no right to
the Homestead by extension of our marital estate analogue. See
generally Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, % 20. In a divorce context,
even absent an agreement, "premarital property is considered
separate property and will be retained by the party who brought
it into the marriage." Rappleve v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 263
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Here, Wife and Husband contracted to keep
their premarital property separate as part of the Agreement. See
Uzelac If 2005 UT App 234, *h 18. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court's denial of Wife's motion and hold that the estate has no
right to the Homestead.
II.

Classification of Devisees

fl9 Wife next argues that the court erred in categorizing the
Children as general devisees. Rather, Wife contends, the Will
and the Agreement treat her as a general pecuniary devisee and
the Children as residuary devisees. This would mean, Wife
argues, that the Homestead would have to be reconveyed to the
estate and sold in order to satisfy her claim against the estate,
as well as to give her prejudgment interest.3 We disagree.
f20 A pecuniary devise is a testamentary gift of a specified sum
of money, either a particular dollar amount or "a formula from
which a sum of money is derived." Restatement (Third) of Prop.:
Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5.1 cmt. c (1999). The
pecuniary devises in this Will are the $5,000.00 each to two
grandchildren. While the trial court on remand determined a
dollar amount that Wife is entitled to under the Agreement, this
alone does not, contrary to Wife's assertions, make the devise
pecuniary. See id. ("Any devise that is payable out of the
general assets of the estate is a general devise. For example, a
devise of 'all of my property' or of 'all of my personal
property' is a general devise, as is a devise of 'one-half of my
estate.'"). 4 Because Wife is not a pecuniary devisee, her

3

The trial court on remand found that the "[d]ate of
judgment is the appropriate starting place for interest since
this is an action on the interpretation of [the Agreement] rather
than a general pecuniary devise as alleged by [Wife]." Since we
agree with the trial court that Wife is not a pecuniary devisee,
we accordingly affirm the lower court's ruling that "[t]he
requirements for imposition of pre-judgment interest have not
been met."
4

While "the Official Comment to Uniform Probate Code § 2-604
(continued...)
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judgment against the estate does not entitle her to the
reconveyance and sale of the Homestead to satisfy her claim. Cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902(2) (Supp. 2007) (giving, for purposes
of abatement, a pecuniary devisee "a general devise to the extent
of the failure or insufficiency" of that particular property
devised).
i|21 Our prior analysis of the Will and the Agreement determined
that it was Husband's and Wife's intention "to [keep] property
Husband and Wife brought into the marriage [separate], not
property they obtained during the marriage." Uzelac I. 2005 UT
App 234, H 18. As such, both the Children and Wife are general
devisees, but to separate property--items acquired before and
after Husband's and Wife's marriage in April 1976, respectively.
To hold otherwise would run counter to Husband's intent, which is
the foundation for any interpretation of testamentary documents.
See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102(2)(b) (1993); In re Estate of
Kleinman, 970 P.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Utah 1998). Thus, we affirm
the trial court's ruling that the Children are general devisees
as well. 5
III.

Calculating Wife's Claim Against the Estate

1J22 On cross-appeal, the Children argue that the trial court
improperly included POD accounts when calculating the amount of
Wife's claim under the Agreement. Specifically, they argue that
because POD accounts are outside the probate estate, they are not
"held at death" and, therefore, Wife is not entitled to these
monies.
f23 A POD account is one "payable on request to one person
during lifetime and on that person's death to one or more POD
payees." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(10) (Supp. 2007); see also
id. § 75-6-110 (1993). POD accounts are held outside of probate
and transfer upon death to the payee. See Southwick v. Leone (In
re Estate of Leone), 860 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
("Utah law explicitly provides that [POD] accounts are
non-testamentary contracts."). This notwithstanding, using the
marital estate analogue, we instructed the trial court to

4

(...continued)
treats [a devise of 'all of my property' or of 'one-half of my
estate'] as a residuary devise," the code does so in the narrow
context of "the special antilapse rule of that section."
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
§ 5.1 Reporter's Note, cmt. c (1999).
5

While the trial court did not explicitly rule that Wife was
a general devisee, it treated her as such. We affirm this
implicit ruling.
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"determin[e] . . . what property of Husband's is available to
satisfy [Wife's] claim under the Agreement." Uzelac I, 2005 App
234, % 21, 114 P.3d 1164. Under the Agreement, Wife is entitled
to all of Husband's assets acquired during their marriage.
K24 The parties stipulated to the amount of $277,716.00 in
Husband's accounts at the time of his death, and none of the
parties introduced any evidence suggesting that these amounts
were not acquired during the marriage. Thus, it appears that the
parties essentially agreed that all $277,716.00 was acquired
after Wife's marriage to Husband or otherwise intended to be part
of Wife's claim against the estate. Under these circumstances,
we cannot say the finding of the trial court that the sum to Wife
was "after acquired property" was clearly erroneous. See Utah
Labor Relations Bd. v. Broadway Shoe Repairing Co., 120 Utah 585,
236 P. 2d 1072, 1076 (1951) (upholding an agency factual finding
where the "finding [was] reasonably deducible from the evidence
and the parties had a fair opportunity to refute i t " ) . We
therefore affirm the trial court's calculation of Wife's claim.
CONCLUSION
125 We affirm the trial court's denial of Wife's Motion to
Reconvey the Homestead to satisfy the Wife's claims. We also
affirm the trial court's classification of the Children and Wife
as general devisees. Further, we affirm the trial court's
finding on the amount of Wife's claim. Thus, "the case [has]
effectively end[ed] because no money [is] available to pay
[Wife's] claims against the estate . . . --the only remaining
business in this case, according to the record." Kelly v. West
One Trust Co. (In re Estate of Morrison), 933 P.2d 1015, 1017
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

James Z. Davis, Judge

H26

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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EXHIBIT B
UZELACI
In re Estate of Uzelac
114 P.3d 1164,526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33,2005 UT App 234

In re Estate of Uzelac
114 P.3d 1164, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2005 UT App 234

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
^[1 Barbara Uzelac (Wife) appeals from a trial court order denying her certain property under an
Ante Nuptial Agreement (the Agreement). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
f2 On April 14, 1976, Wife and Louis J. Uzelac (Husband) were married. Prior to their marriage,
Husband and Wife executed the Agreement, which provides, in relevant part:
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of the real, personal or
mixed property owned by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and separate
property of him or her or their respective estates.
In the event that either party to this Agreement should sell, convert or exchange any of the
property owned by him or her prior to the marriage, then the proceeds from such sale or
exchange or such other real or personal property acquired from such sale shall be deemed
subject to this Agreement, not as property acquired during the marriage, but as substitute
property owned by the party prior to marriage.
The parties further agree that all property, whether real, personal or mixed acquired by the
parties shall go to the survivor, in the event of the death of the other, or if otherwise
terminated, shall be equitably divided as the parties may agree or as may be decreed by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
In the event of the simultaneous death of the parties all property acquired by them during
their marriage, be it real, personal or mixed shall be divided one-half to [Wife's] estate
and one-half to [Husband's] estate.
f 3 After Husband and Wife were married, Husband prepared a will (Will), which directs that
Husband's estate is to be divided as follows: (1) all debts, expenses, and administration expenses
are to be paid; (2) Husband's two daughters are to receive equal shares of Husband's property; (3)
Wife is to receive property per the terms of the Agreement; and (4) Husband's two
granddaughters are to receive $5000.00 each. It is undisputed that both the Agreement and the
Will are enforceable.
^4 At the time Husband and Wife were married, Husband owned (1) two parcels of real property,
on which Husband and Wife resided at the time of his death (Residence); (2) six water shares in
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company; and (3) $52,012.42 in his bank account. During their
marriage, both Husband and Wife kept numerous separate bank accounts and deposited most of
the money they acquired during the marriage into their respective separate accounts.
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H5 On November 6, 1999, Husband died. At the time of his death, Husband had three "payable
on death" (POD) accounts totaling $189,049.15 with his two daughters as beneficiaries, and one
POD account totaling $12,790.00 with Wife as beneficiary. In addition, Husband had non-POD
accounts totaling $75,876.85 and stocks worth $36,950.91. On December 7, 1999, the Will
entered into probate.
•1167
| 6 Wife received the $12,790.00 from the POD account to which she was a beneficiary; a life
estate in the Residence pursuant to the Agreement; $4858.83 from Husband and Wife's joint
accounts; and $15,000.00 withdrawn from one of Husband's accounts prior to his death and
deposited after his death into the joint account. Husband's two daughters received all other
property owned by Husband at the time of his death, including the Residence subject to Wife's
life estate.
T[7 Wife challenged this distribution on numerous grounds, essentially arguing that under the
Agreement she is entitled to all property Husband acquired during the marriage. After a bench
trial, the trial court did not disturb the distribution, ruling that the Agreement provides that Wife
is to receive only the property Husband and Wife acquired jointly and held together during the
marriage. Wife appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] f 8 First, Wife argues that she qualifies as a creditor under Utah Code sections 75-3-801 to
-816, which give priority to her claims under the Agreement. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-801
to-816 (2000). Interpretation of statutes presents a question of law we review for correctness. See
In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13, ^ 7, 63 P.3d 1284.
[2] TJ9 Second, Wife argues that the trial court erred by interpreting the Agreement to provide that
Wife receives only property Husband and Wife acquired together and held jointly during their
marriage. We review a trial court's interpretation of a contract for correctness. See Nova Cas. Co.
v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f 6, 983 P.2d 575.
[3] 1J10 Finally, Wife argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Husband's daughters had not
waived their rights to certain personal property. Where the facts are undisputed, "the proper
standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness." Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, U 16, 982 P.2d 572.
ANALYSIS
I. Wife's Status as a Creditor
[4] T[l 1 Wife first argues that she is a creditor, as defined in Utah Code sections 75-3-801 to
-816, which gives priority to her claims. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-801 to -816. The personal
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representative of Husband's estate (PR) argues that any claim Wife may have had as a creditor is
now barred by the one-year time limitation in Utah Code section 75-3-803. We agree with the
PR.
^[12 Under section 75-3-803, a creditor must bring a claim, at the latest, "one year after the
decedent's death." Id. § 75-3-803(l)(a). Because Wife filed her breach of contract claim over two
years after Husband's death, her claim falls outside the one-year limitation.
f 13 Wife argues that although she did not formally bring her claim for over two years, she did
present her claim to the PR within the one-year limitation by providing the PR a copy of the
Agreement. Section 75-3-804(1 )(a) provides that a claimant need not commence a court action to
comply with the one-year limitation, but rather "may deliver or mail to the personal
representative, or the personal representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim
indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed." Id. §
75-3-804(l)(a). Further, the written statement of claim must at least describe "the general nature
of the obligation," as measured by the "notice pleading standard" under rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quotations omitted)
(citing Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah Ct.App.1988)).
T}14 Merely providing the PR with a copy of the Agreement, which all parties have always agreed
is binding, without explaining how the Agreement had been breached or the amount she was
claiming as a creditor under the Agreement, does not begin to satisfy the requirements of notice
pleading. Wife's failure to give the PR notice of the amount she was claiming as a creditor or
what her theory of recovery as a creditor was * 1168 under the Agreement prejudiced the PR as
he proceeded to treat her as a beneficiary and thus took actions which were contrary to her now
claimed status. Thus, even assuming that Wife would otherwise qualify as a creditor, her claim is
barred by the one-year limitation in section 75-3-803.
II. Interpretation of the Agreement
[5] ^fl5 Wife argues that the trial court erred by construing the language of the Agreement, "all
property... acquired by the parties," to mean all property acquired together by the parties. The PR
argues that the trial court's interpretation is correct, and thus, under the Agreement Wife is
entitled only to the property jointly acquired and held by Husband and Wife at the time of
Husband's death. We agree with Wife.
[6][7][8] f 16 "The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the
intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002
UT 88, U 17, 54 P.3d 1139. When interpreting a contract, "[w]e look to the writing itself to
ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id. at ^ 18 (alterations in
original) (quotations and citation omitted). "If the language within the four corners of the contract
is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual
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language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. at f 19 (quotations and
citation omitted).
1fl7 The disputed language from the Agreement is as follows:
The parties further agree that all property, whether real, personal or mixed acquired by the parties
shall go to the survivor, in the event of the death of the other, or if otherwise terminated, shall be
equitably divided as the parties may agree or as may be decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The PR argues that when read in light of the surrounding clauses, it is evident that this language
must be read as "property acquired by the parties together shall go to the survivor," which would
mean that Wife is not entitled to property Husband acquired on his own and kept in separate
accounts. The surrounding clauses are as follows:
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of the real, personal or
mixed property owned by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and separate
property of him or her or their respective estates.
In the event that either party to this Agreement should sell, convert or exchange any of the
property owned by him or her prior to the marriage, then the proceeds from such sale or exchange
or such other real or personal property acquired from such sale shall be deemed subject to this
Agreement, not as property acquired during the marriage, but as substitute property owned by the
party prior to marriage.
Tfl8 The PR argues that these clauses demonstrate that the parties intended to keep their assets
separate so that their marriage would not undermine their intention that certain property transfer
to their children. Wife argues that these clauses demonstrate this intention was only as to
property Husband and Wife brought into the marriage, not property they obtained during the
marriage. We agree with Wife. The surrounding clauses merely make clear that the property
acquired during the marriage is to be treated differently and is to go to the survivor.
Tfl9 The plain meaning of "acquired by the parties" in this context also cuts against the PR's
reading. In divorce cases, we have consistently interpreted language such as "acquired by the
parties during marriage" to mean all property either party acquires, whether held in separate
accounts or not. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (using "acquired by
the parties during marriage" to mean property acquired by either party or both); see also Elman v.
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,1j 38, 45 P.3d 176 (same).
f20 Because the contested language also speaks of property "acquired by the parties" in the event
of termination of the marriage for reasons other than death, we must assume *1169 that it has the
same plain meaning it has in the divorce context. We conclude the plain language of the
Agreement provides that Wife is entitled to all property acquired during the marriage and held at
Husband's death.
TJ21 We vacate all orders previously entered by the trial court based on its erroneous
interpretation of the Agreement including the order of September 27, 2003. We remand for the
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trial court to determine, under our interpretation of the Agreement, the amount owed to Wife as a
beneficiary under the Will as per the Agreement. We also remand for a determination of what
property of Husbandfs is available to satisfy her claim under the Agreement. [FN2]
FN2. We do not concur in Judge Orme's concurring opinion. The issue discussed therein was
not before the court, we did not address it, and it should not be considered the law of the case.
We leave it to the trial court to determine what is "all property acquired during the marriage and
held at Husband's death."
III. Waiver
[9] f22 Wife argues that the trial court erred by failing to recognize the PR's waiver of rights to
certain personal property. The PR argues that the trial court did not err because it merely required
a verbal waiver to be reduced to writing before recognizing it. We agree with Wife.
Tf23 During the trial, one of Husband's daughters stated that she was interested in receiving only
nine items of Husband's personal property. When asked whether the PR was waiving claim to all
other items of personal property, his attorney stated that Wife could keep "everything else." After
trial, the PR failed to include this waiver in the draft order, and Wife objected to the order on that
basis. The court entered the order over Wife's objection, stating that the PR could file a separate
written waiver if he chose.
[ 10][ 11][12] ^24 The trial court erred by refusing to recognize the waiver to personal property
made in open court. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be
express or implied." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah
1993) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The PR's statement that Wife could keep all
items of personal property except those specifically identified by Husband's daughter meets all
these requirements. Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to recognize the PR's waiver.
CONCLUSION
^[25 Because Wife brought her claim as a creditor after the one-year limitation period had
expired, the trial court did not err by refusing to recognize Wife's claims as a creditor. However,
the trial court did err by construing the Agreement to entitle Wife only to property Husband and
Wife acquired and held together during marriage. Also, the trial court erred by failing to
recognize the PR's waiver to certain personal property. Accordingly, we affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.

%L61 CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.

ORME, Judge (concurring):
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^|27 I concur in the lead opinion and agree that Wife, as the surviving spouse, is entitled under the
agreement to all marital property not otherwise dealt with in the agreement, including property
Husband acquired during the marriage. However, I write separately to draw the trial court's
attention to the general rule, not mentioned in the lead opinion, that any appreciation of, or
interest on, premarital property is separate property and not part of the marital estate. See Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,1320 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("The general rule is that equity requires that
each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any
appreciation of the separate property."). There are some exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Burt v.
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct.App.1990), but if none of the exceptions apply, the trial
court must, in *1170 determining what Wife is entitled to under the Agreement, ensure that any
interest on, or appreciation of, Husband's premarital property is regarded as his separate property
rather than as property acquired during the marriage.
^[28 I go out of my way to make this point not because I see any suggestion to the contrary in the
lead opinion, but only because I gather from comments made at oral argument that Wife's
counsel may hope to employ an approach on remand that reflects a different view. Specifically, it
was mentioned that certain bank accounts were in a particular amount at the time of marriage and
were several times larger at the time of Husband's death. The implication seemed to be that the
difference was property acquired during the marriage to which Wife would be entitled. This
approach ignores the general rule I have highlighted. In actuality, Wife would only be entitled to
the difference net of the interest attributable to Husband's premarital principal.
T|291 must also offer a couple of comments about footnote 2 of the lead opinion, the addition of
which is what prompted our issuance of an Amended Opinion in this case. This footnote was
added in response to Wife's petition for rehearing, which was aimed solely at my separate
opinion. The thrust of the petition was that equitable principles used in making property
distributions in divorce cases are inapplicable here. As to footnote 2, my colleagues are right: the
issue I have highlighted was not before the trial court, given the erroneous interpretation it made
of the Agreement; the majority chose not to address it; and as my comment is that of a single
appellate judge, it surely is not "the law of the case." All of that having been said, it is far from
aberrational for such a viewpoint to be expressed. On the contrary, appellate courts often
will-and often should—comment on matters likely to come before the trial court on remand. See,
e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ^ 22, 20 P.3d 388 (stating that "where an
appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty
of'pass[ing] on matters which may then become material'") (citation omitted). Such comments
are necessarily advisory only, as the appellate court can do little more than guess at how the
proceedings on remand will unfold.
TJ30 As to the main point made in the petition for rehearing, I can only observe that the lead
opinion itself, in developing the interpretative analysis that leads to Wife's success on Issue II,
relies-and appropriately so-on two divorce cases. It seems obvious that divorce cases will be the
lodestar of jurisprudence concerning marital property, whether it be on the question of what the
phrase "acquired by the parties" means or the question of how to treat interest earned or
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appreciation accrued during marriage on a spouse's separate property. Were I the trial judge
responsible to sort this all out on remand, I would be quite skeptical about the proposition that
the rules defining marital property vary considerably, depending on the legal context in which
such issues arise.
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